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Abstract
Although the standard of consulting Indigenous peoples in decisions affecting them is well rooted 
internationally as well as in national legal systems, different views and patterns of problems are 
associated with the concept and its practice. This paper briefly analyses and contrasts the duty 
to consult Indigenous peoples through a comparison of the three Nordic countries Norway, 
Finland and Sweden, and Canada. Based on domestic legal sources, the focus of the paper is to 
explore the legal foundation that has given rise to the specific set of rules for the duty to consult, 
that is, the rationale behind the evolving of the rules. The first finding is that the rules differ 
among the three Nordic countries, with Sweden being the only country that lacks specific rules. 
Secondly, whereas Canada has developed its own duty to consult primarily through domestic 
case law, in the Nordic countries, duty to consult is related to international law obligations. 
Consultation duties that have evolved from domestic law may be easier to accept than “foreign” 
regulations imposed on national legal systems. This could explain the reluctance among the 
Nordic States to accept specific consultations with the Sami Parliament and other Sami groups, 
particularly in Sweden.
Keywords: consultation; participation; Indigenous rights; Sami rights; Aboriginal rights; 
Nordic law; Canadian law
Responsible Editor: Hans-Kristian Hernes, UiT - The Arctic University of Norway, 
Tromsø, Norway.
Received: April 2017; Accepted: October 2017; Published: February 2018
Christina Allard
26
1. Introduction 
Consultation is an increasingly important aspect of Indigenous people’s law, including 
in the Arctic region,1 its purpose being to engage in good faith and reach unanimity 
and understanding. Rules concerning consultation are designed to build dialogue; it is 
expected that the State and affected Indigenous people try to reaching a mutually sat-
isfactory agreement in earnest. However, there is no specific formula for consultation 
that works in all circumstances and across all jurisdictions, rather, its practice tends to 
be country specific notwithstanding international attention on the matter.2 With re-
spect to the procedural side of Indigenous rights, consultation of indigenous groups by 
a State can be seen as a key element in ensuring successful melding between groups in 
bi- or multi-cultural societies. Consultation and participation are understood to form 
the cornerstone of the ILO Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries, 1989 (hereinafter ILO Convention No. 169) and the basis for 
applying other articles.3 Participatory rights have also been strongly promoted in the 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), 2007, especially the 
concept of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) of Indigenous peoples.4
Today there are many international documents that secure participatory rights 
for Indigenous peoples, among which Articles 6 and 7 of ILO Convention No. 169, 
which are legally binding to its parties, figure prominently. Consultations do not, 
however, allow for “veto power” over developments,5 nor do they hold any prom-
ise that matters pivotal to the Indigenous community will be accommodated and 
adopted. It has been argued that consultation as a procedure is not meant to consti-
tute an effective veto.6
The law, nevertheless, is evolving, both in the international and domestic spheres. 
It should be noted that, in line with UNDRIP, there is presently a shift from consul-
tation to consent in international law, an issue that will not be addressed here. The 
basic idea of FPIC is rather straightforward, but legally it is a contested and confused 
concept.7 Whereas FPIC should be understood as an extension of already established 
international standards regarding the participatory and consultation rights of Indig-
enous peoples,8 legislators and courts in the countries included in this study have 
thus far not paid much attention to the concept. Notably, Canada first voted against 
the adoption of UNDRIP, primarily because of FPIC, but has recently started ad-
dressing and discussing implementation of UNDRIP as a means for transformative 
change in state-Indigenous relationships (see Ch. 4). Even though domestic courts 
have made general references to the Declaration, for instance, regarding its useful-
ness as an interpretive aid to Canadian legislation, courts have thus far been reluctant 
to rely explicitly on the FPIC standard.9
Hence, this article seeks first to analyse and contrast approaches to the duty to 
consult Indigenous peoples in the Nordic countries, Norway, Finland and Sweden, 
and then contrasts the different rationales for consultation with Canadian law and 
practice concerning the duty to consult. In doing so, this paper describes the legal 
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basis for consultations in the respective jurisdictions by analysing national law, pre-
paratory works and relevant case law. With respect to Swedish law, the paper also 
provides a timely example of corporate consultations in mining situations, revealing 
problematic aspects for Sami reindeer-herding communities.
2. The Nordic Legal Context and Constitutional Protection of Sami Culture
This section provides relevant insights into the Nordic legal context in order to fa-
cilitate an understanding of the subsequent analysis of Nordic law. Of fundamental 
importance is how claims for Sami rights in the Nordic countries have generally 
been channelled through public government commissions that investigate and rec-
ommend legal amendments. Commission reports form part of the preparatory works 
for a statute, themselves an important source of law in interpreting the content of 
legislation. In contrast to Canada, case law claims for Sami rights are rather limited, 
especially in Finland and Sweden,10 where civil law jurisdictions do not have the 
same tradition of filing lawsuits to solve disputes.11
There are no Sami reserve lands or title lands, equivalent to those established in Can-
ada, nor any historical treaties with the Sami. Collective Sami ownership is not recog-
nised, but strong user rights for reindeer-herding Sami, the reindeer-herding right, is.12 In 
2001 the Norwegian Supreme Court, however, upheld collective ownership of a limited 
area by a local community with a Sami majority population (the Svartskogen case).13
On the whole, it has been difficult for the three states to acknowledge the legacy of 
their colonization of traditional Sami areas, although, by ratifying ILO Convention 
No. 169 in 1990, Norway has taken promising steps towards reassessing its relation-
ship with the Sami as a people. It should be mentioned that Norwegian ratification of 
ILO Convention No. 169 coincided with several other developments in Norway, in 
particular (1) the adoption of a specific Sami Act in 1987, aimed at promoting Sami 
languages, culture and way of life, which included the establishment of a national 
Sámediggi (Sami Parliament), and (2) a new Sami clause in the Constitution (now 
section 108) in 1988, which addresses State obligations to safeguard and develop the 
Sami language, culture and way of life. After years of investigations and a bill, Finland 
is again considering ratification of ILO Convention No. 169, whereas the prospect of 
Sweden ratifying the Convention is unforeseeable.
The three countries are currently in the process of adopting a Nordic Sami Con-
vention, based on relevant Human Rights treaties and to some extent aligned with 
UNDRIP.14 It guarantees minimum rights for the Sami (Article 2) across all relevant 
sectors and aims at harmonizing national rules in the long term. The objective of the 
Convention (Article 1) is to affirm and strengthen the rights of the Sami people to 
promote their language, culture and society with the smallest possible interference 
from national borders. The text also strengthens participatory rights, especially for 
the Sami Parliaments in Norway, Sweden and Finland (Articles 4, 17–18).15 Arti-
cle 17 also says that prior decisions, “consent”, from the Sami Parliament shall be 
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pursued. It should be noted here that the Sami Parliaments in Norway, Sweden and 
Finland, named Sámediggi in the Sami language, lack any law-making powers and 
function quite differently comparatively.16 Although the Sámediggi do function as the 
most important representative body for the Sami as a people, they are by no means 
to be confused with real “parliaments”.
Constitutional protection of Sami culture also differs between the three States. 
Comparatively, Norway and Finland offer better constitutional protection of Sami 
culture and livelihoods, even though provisions are seldom applied.17 The purpose 
behind the Norwegian provisions was explicitly to redress past grievances and assim-
ilation policies towards the Sami.18 The provision in the Swedish constitution, called 
the Instrument of Government, does not create any enforceable rights for the Sami.19 
After an important amendment in 2010, it now states that “[t]he opportunities of the 
Sami people (…) to preserve and develop a cultural and social life of their own shall 
be promoted”. Enforceable rights instead appear in Chapter 2 of the Act. None of the 
three State’s constitutional provisions impose the duty to consult the Sami.
3. The States’ Consultation Duty in the Three Nordic States
The duty on the states to consult the Sami was not on the public agenda before the 
focus on consultations in international law increased. ILO Convention No. 169 has 
been instrumental for developing such standards in Norway and Finland. Specific 
provisions that relate to the Sami as an Indigenous people, holding specific rights 
to be consulted by the State, did not come about until 1995 in Finland and 2005 in 
Norway. Sweden still lacks specific legislation, but a law-proposal has just been re-
leased, and is currently under hearing before it may be furthered into a bill. There is 
no independent case law on the matter. Consequently, among the Nordic countries 
it is clear that the states’ duty to consult the Sami is considered an obligation under 
international law stemming from various Human Rights’ Conventions.
3.1. Two Consultation Agreements in Norway
The legal basis for the duty to consult the Sami in Norway lies in two consultation 
agreements. A basic Consultation Agreement, in translation “Procedures for Consul-
tations between State Authorities and the Sami Parliament”,20 was signed in May 2005 
between the Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation and the Sami Parlia-
ment. The Sami Parliament formally accepted the Agreement the following month. 
Thereafter it was extended to the whole of the Norwegian Government, including 
regional governments and state enterprises, through Royal Decree. A second specific 
agreement was negotiated concerning consultation on nature conservation matters in 
traditional Sami areas, here called the Consultation Agreement on Conservation,21 
between the Ministry of Environment and the Sami Parliament in January 2007.
The story behind the development of an agreement concerning consultations is linked 
to the drafting of the Finnmark Act, an Act that established a new management system 
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for land and natural resources in Finnmark, the northernmost county of Norway and a 
significant Sami area. During the law-making process, the Parliament’s law committee 
undertook four meetings with the Sami Parliament and the Finnmark County Council 
on the draft legal text of the Act, resulting in substantial amendments to the legal text. 
Turning those initial meetings into a formal agreement was nevertheless a response to 
ILO Convention No. 169 Articles 6, 7 and 15, as well as indirectly Article 27 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 (ICCPR).22
This basic Consultation Agreement is the single most important undertaking for 
Sami rights in Norway, in that it gives the Sami the right to participate and influ-
ence decision-making at all stages where Sami interests and cultures are directly 
affected.23 The Agreement makes it difficult to disregard Sami customs, customary 
law and other cultural aspects since the Sami Parliament, or other Sami groups, must 
be consulted beforehand. Indeed the Agreement has meant that the Sami have had 
a substantial influence on, for instance, the drafting of new legislation such as the 
Finnmark Act, 2005, the Reindeer Herding Act, 2007, the Planning and Building 
Act, 2008 and the Nature Diversity Act, 2009.
The basic Consultation Agreement has nine articles, covering everything from the 
objective and scope of the Agreement to how consultation procedures should be 
carried out. Guidelines to the basic Consultation Agreement, issued by the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Affairs in 2006, aid interpretation of the Agreement and the 
state’s consultation duty.
Behind the state’s consultation duty, explicitly stated in both Consultation Agree-
ments and the Guidelines, is the Sami’s status as an Indigenous people and their 
right to be consulted in matters directly affecting them. The agreement is seen as a 
practical means to implement Norway’s obligations under international law. Article 
6 of ILO Convention No. 169 is referred to in particular.24 Consultations shall be 
undertaken in good faith and with the aim of reaching unanimity or consent.25 More-
over, these consultations should also facilitate the sense of partnership between state 
authorities and the Sami Parliament (article 1). However, there is a reminder that the 
state always has the final say and legal competence in any matter.26
Who are the subjects of the Consultation Agreement? From the basic Consulta-
tion Agreement it is clear that not only is the Norwegian Government bound by the 
Agreement, but “state authorities”, meaning – apart from the Government and its 
ministries – directorates and other subordinate state agencies, such as regional gov-
ernments (i.e. county councils) and state enterprises in as much as they exercise pub-
lic authority.27 In particular, it is the state authority that holds the decision-making 
power that is bound by the consultation duty, but in certain instances this duty may 
also apply to subordinate authorities, such as regional governments, which may have 
the responsibility of investigating certain matters prior to decisions.28 Municipalities, 
which have considerable governmental powers on the local level, are, however, not 
included.29 The reason for this omission is that the Government wanted to investigate 
further how municipal decision-making could be included in an expedient way.
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With regard to the Sami, the Sami Parliament, which serves as a representative for 
all the different Sami interests, is the key beneficiary of the Agreement. Under cir-
cumstances where there is a local effect on the Sami, other Sami organisations may 
also be subject to the Agreement.30
Sami reindeer-herding representatives have a special position here; reindeer herd-
ers have their own branch organization and a tradition of representing their own 
interests. The emphasis in Article 6.1(a) of ILO Convention No. 169, in particular 
the wording “the peoples concerned”, and the Guidelines to the basic Consultation 
Agreement from 2006 acknowledges that Norway does not fulfil its obligations if 
consultation is limited to the Sami Parliament. Consequently, in addition to the duty 
to consult the Sami Parliament, state authorities may also need to consult other Sami 
groups, in particular concerning matters that apply to traditional Sami industries.
Whether the state authorities should consult with Sami organisations or individual 
right-bearers depends on the matter at hand.31 For instance, legislative proposals 
or other matters of general interest are more likely to concern broader local Sami 
organisations and specific branch organisations, whereas single administrative mea-
sures, such as environmental/natural resource planning, and procedures concerning 
permits related to land use and exploitation, often involve a potential infringement 
on reindeer-herding rights. Even Swedish reindeer-herding communities with trans-
national reindeer-herding rights in Norway must occasionally be consulted if their 
interests are directly affected.
This leads us to the scope of consultation. The basic Consultation Agreement ap-
plies equally to “legislative or administrative measures that may directly affect Sami 
interests” (article 1). In other words, it is wide-ranging and includes all material 
and immaterial forms of Sami culture (article 2). It relates, for example, to issues 
of cultural heritage, religion, language, traditional knowledge, land ownership and 
user rights as well as competing land utilization in larger planning and licensing 
processes, apart from law drafting.32 Consultation encompasses all forms of Sami 
culture, such as cultural heritage, property rights, land administration, nature con-
servation, traditional knowledge, music, education, health and social welfare. The 
geographical scope of the Agreement is limited to “traditional Sami areas” in mat-
ters concerning land administration, competing land utilization and land rights 
(article 2). Although this area is difficult to demark, it encompasses in principle 
the lands where reindeer herding is carried out today, comprising about 40 percent 
of the Norwegian territory.33 Importantly, all other general matters apply equally 
across Norway.
Deviation from the procedures in the basic Consultation Agreement may be al-
lowed if the parties agree on other provisions for certain areas of affairs.34 The above-
mentioned Consultation Agreement on Conservation from 2007 is an example of 
this, with its more specific procedures related to protected area designation and 
management. The provisions focus on consultations concerning nature conservation 
plan processes on the local, regional and national levels.35 The Agreement includes 
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six articles and explicitly mentions “the Sami Parliament/Sami organizations/Sami 
right-bearers” as the beneficiaries (for example in article 1). Its scope is limited to 
“traditional Sami areas” (article 2). Competent state authorities are regional gov-
ernments, the Norwegian Environment Agency and Ministry for the Environment 
(article 5).
All in all, the two Agreements are wide-ranging and make it possible for the Sami 
Parliament and local Sami who are affected to have a real influence both on deci-
sion-making and objectives. Being political agreements, alleged breaches of the duty 
to consult the Sami are difficult to enforce nationally.36 Such matters may only be 
brought to light in connection with, for instance, the ILO’s report and complaint pro-
cedures. There is, however, a proposal from the Sami Rights Committee from 2007 
for a new act to include the state’s consultation duties towards the Sami.37 It has not 
yet become a bill, but consultation with the Sami Parliament is currently underway. 
It is also worth mentioning that several consultation agreements have been nego-
tiated between regional governments (within traditional Sami areas) and the Sami 
Parliament, such as the Troms, Nordland and Hedmark counties. As such, these 
agreements focus more on language, art, music, theater, sports, etc. than the use of 
land and resources, but nonetheless they are an important acknowledgement that the 
Sami Parliament has a role in Norwegian public administration.38
3.2. Statutory Recognition of Consultation in Finland
In Finland, the state’s statute-based consultation duty towards the Sami is presently 
limited geographically to an administratively demarked area in the Finnish far north, 
“the Sami homeland”.39 Within this specific area the Finnish Constitution from 1999 
grants the Sami linguistic and cultural self-government,40 which is related to the Sami 
as an Indigenous people and which is also reiterated in section 1 of the Sami Parlia-
ment Act, 1995. A provision stating the duty to consult the Sami is included in this 
Act (section 9).
Finland’s ambition was to become party to ILO Convention No. 169 and a bill 
had even been drafted recommending ratification of the Convention, but it was unex-
pectedly tabled by Parliament in spring 2015.41 Another bill aimed at reforming and 
updating the Sami Parliament Act, including an amended provision concerning con-
sultation, was also postponed.42 Of relevance here is the suggestion that consultation 
should be expanded beyond the Sami homeland and also be binding on regional and 
local authorities. Despite setbacks, the Finnish Government still aims to strengthen 
the consultation rights of the Sami by revising the consultation provision in the Sami 
Parliament Act, 1995, and the Ministry of Justice is currently preparing guidelines 
regarding consultations applicable for state officials.
Section 9 of the current Sami Parliament Act uses the wording “negotiate” 
(förhandla), but it is clear that the purpose behind the provision is the equivalent 
of consultation. Evidently, the Finnish language lacks the term “consult”, therefore 
the closest term “negotiate” was chosen. The provision states that “[t]he authorities 
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shall negotiate with the Sami Parliament in all far-reaching and important measures 
which may directly and in a specific way affect the status of the Sami as an indige-
nous people”. The term “authorities” is not defined in the Act, but in preparatory 
works it is said to include Ministries and state authorities responsible for public 
administration tasks.43
The scope for consultation is exemplified in section 9 in five specific areas: i) com-
munity planning, ii) land management and protected areas, iii) exploration and ex-
traction of minerals on state-owned lands, iv) amendments in legislation or public 
policy related to Sami livelihoods, and v) Sami education and social and health care. 
A sixth area mentioned in the provision is a catch-all because it relates to other mea-
sures that affect Sami language, culture or status as an Indigenous people. An impor-
tant amendment was made in 2011, aimed at aligning Finnish legislation with the 
requirements of ILO Convention No. 169, when mineral exploration and extraction 
on state-owned lands was included in the consultation duty.
As mentioned above, consultations are restricted to the confined area of the Sami 
homeland. This area encompasses some ten percent of Finnish territory, 90 percent 
of which is state-owned land.44 The demarcation of the area is contested, with some 
scholars claiming that the traditional Sami area is in fact larger.45 Another limitation 
of Finland’s consultation provision is that the beneficiary is limited to the Sami Par-
liament; local Sami groups, such as reindeer-herders, are not affected. One reason for 
this exclusion may be that the Sami do not officially have a specific reindeer-herding 
right in accordance with reindeer-herding legislation, nor is reindeer herding an ex-
clusive Sami occupation in Finland.46 Moreover, the Skolt Sami, a Sami sub-group 
living in the northeast corner of Finland, are the subject of a specific Skolt Act, 1995, 
which does not give them independent consultation rights with the Finnish State.47
The Sami Parliament, according to section 6 of the Sami Parliament Act, is the 
body meant to represent the Finnish Sami in national and international matters. 
Therefore, in some instances and according to other legislation, the Sami Parliament 
is given the opportunity to comment on legislative proposals (remiss), to be heard, 
and to make observations.48 These are, however, common administrative procedures 
that also apply to other interests groups. Swedish law has similar rules, which will be 
briefly addressed below.
3.3. Lack of State Obligations Concerning Consultation in Swedish Law
In contrast to Norway and Finland, Sweden does not have an agreement or a piece of 
legislation in place yet which includes specific consultation duties towards the Sami. A 
first proposal in 2009 to implement such a provision was not successful because other 
parts of the proposal were heavily criticised by the Sami Parliament and legal scholars, 
eventually halting formulation of a bill.49 A second proposal suggesting the enactment 
of a specific Act on consultations with the Sami Parliament was released in late Sep-
tember 2017.50 It is likely that this legislation will be passed, not least because of the 
pending Nordic Sami Convention that stipulates consultation duties with the Sami.
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I will now turn briefly to the two legal proposals. The reason behind the 2009 pro-
posal was international criticism of Sweden by several international human rights’ 
bodies. The report concluded that this implies that the Sami as an Indigenous peo-
ple may have special status in relation to other ethnic groups.51 Ironically, no prior 
consultations were held with the Sami Parliament regarding this proposed provision. 
This reluctance to consult is also revealed by the status of the proposed consultation 
provision, which was to be included in subordinate legislation in a regulation with 
instructions to the Government Offices/Ministries, and in detailed provisions by de-
cree (arbetsordning). The legal status of a regulation is below that of an act in cases of 
inconsistency. A decree has even lower legal status. In this way, the regulation was not 
complicated by the creation of specific constitutional rights for the Sami.52 Moreover, 
this provision was limited to consultations between the Ministries and the Sami Par-
liament in law-making matters.53
Instead, the recent legal proposal suggests a new act on consultation with nine sec-
tions, drafted with inspiration from the Norwegian consultation model, the Nordic 
Sami Convention and recommendations from international human rights’ monitoring 
bodies.54 It is clear from the proposal that the level of ambition has increased sub-
stantially. On the whole the law-proposal is well-balanced. Consultations are to be 
conducted not only with the Sami Parliament, but also with other Sami organisations 
and/or Sami reindeer herding communities if they are particularly affected by a deci-
sion. Moreover, the act has no geographical limitation, unlike the Finnish provision. 
The consultation duty of the State is proposed to include the Swedish government, 
public authorities, county councils and municipalities. Furthermore, consultations are 
to be conducted in good spirit with parties actively seeking agreement or consent on 
matters.
Though it currently lacks an explicit consultation right, the Swedish Sami Parlia-
ment is not entirely devoid of influence. As in Finland, the Swedish Sami Parliament 
has functions related to public administration, specifically commenting on legal pro-
posals and other matters sent to them from the Government and other state author-
ities (remisser). In contrast to the Sami Parliaments in Norway and Finland, their 
Swedish counterpart is paradoxically both an elected assembly and a public authority 
under the jurisdiction of the Swedish Government.55 Under the Sami Parliament Act, 
1992, the Sami Parliament as a public authority is, among other things, tasked with 
cooperating in community planning, and monitoring that Sami interests are taken 
into account, especially with respect to reindeer husbandry. The Sami Parliament has 
additional tasks under other legislation.56
For instance, the Government is obligated under the Swedish Constitution, the 
Instrument of Government from 1974, to obtain information and opinions (yttran-
den) from competent public authorities when preparing government matters.57 The 
Public Administration Act, 1986, also has provisions aimed at facilitating coopera-
tion among public authorities.58 In addition, there is a provision aimed at minorities 
in Sweden that applies to the Sami in general and not only the Sami Parliament. 
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The Act on National Minorities and Minority Languages, 2009, section 5, states 
that public authorities must give national minorities the chance to influence matters 
that concern them, and, as far as is feasible, consult (samråda) with representatives 
for the minorities. This provision is rather ambiguous and designates the Sami as a 
national minority.
If the proposed act on consultation becomes a reality, it will mean something 
entirely different. It will allow the Sami Parliament, other Sami organisations and 
affected reindeer herding communities to have a stronger influence in matters per-
taining to the Sami people and their own future. The question remains, however, why 
has Sweden lagged behind Norway and Finland?
Previous research has shown that public policy in Sweden has treated the Sami 
more as a “national minority” rather than as an autonomous Indigenous people.59 
The notion of building partnerships, explicit for instance in the Norwegian Consulta-
tion Agreement (article 1), is non-existent in the public State-Sami relationship. Nor 
is the idea of a nation-to-nation approach as a means to promote reconciliation part 
of the public vocabulary or rhetoric, as it is, for instance, in Canada. Until the revi-
sion of the Swedish Constitution in 2010, the Sami were still mentioned as a minority 
(cf. above Ch. 2). This has had implications for the Sami rights discourse in Sweden, 
including the state’s duty to consult.60
3.3.1. Corporate Consultations in Swedish Mineral Exploitations
Consultation with the Sami in the context of mining offers a timely example of a 
global situation where the need for minerals is steadily increasing, and the majority 
of mining permit applications in Sweden pertain to Sami reindeer herding areas. 
At the same time, it reveals the shortcomings of Swedish legislation regarding the 
absence of state consultation with the Sami, with potentially far-reaching conse-
quences for the future of reindeer herding in the communities where exploration 
permits have been granted and potential mines may be established. Mineral ex-
ploitation in the Swedish north has garnered recent national and international at-
tention following protest movements by Sami groups, environmental organisations 
and individuals, especially with respect to a planned mine outside Jokkmokk in 
Kallak/Gállok.61
Consultation with the Sami in a Swedish legal context means corporate consul-
tation with affected reindeer-herding communities. It is important to note that this 
form of consultation is not equivalent to the duty to consult Indigenous peoples 
since it does not involve the state or stem from the Sami as an Indigenous people. 
In Sweden this form of consultation is called samråd and is widespread in for in-
stance natural resources statutes related to the consideration of and balance between 
right-holders or other interested parties. In such cases, the state has no particular 
responsibility or role towards the Sami as an Indigenous people.
A common form of corporate consultation is related to the environmental impact 
assessment (EIA). The core environmental statute, the Environmental Code of 1998 
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encompasses rules on EIA for projects in Chapter 6, which many other Acts in the 
environmental/natural resources area refer to, including the Minerals Act, 1991. With 
respect to the EIA, an affected reindeer-herding community is treated like any other 
stakeholder, even when traditional Sami lands are impacted. Moreover, consultation 
does not necessarily involve all aspects relevant to an affected reindeer-herding com-
munity, because its main target is the environmental impact of a project, and not how 
development may affect the reindeer-herding right as a property right or other social/
cultural factors.62
The Minerals Act, written to promote exploitation of Sweden’s mineral resources, 
makes few requirements on mining companies to carry out samråd. In fact, an explo-
ration permit can be issued by the competent authority, the Mining Inspectorate of 
Sweden, without consulting affected reindeer-herding communities, or even prop-
erty owners for that matter.63 With respect to the EIA, there is no requirement for 
mandatory stakeholder consultation, although consultation is normally carried out 
voluntarily by applicants.64 Notably, this practice reveals a gap between written law 
and what companies feel obliged to do. The same applies to the EIA report, where 
a so-called reindeer-herding impact assessment (rennäringsanalys) is usually made 
nowadays.
Amendments made in 2014 in relation to exploration permits, increase information 
flow and dialogue in the early stages of development between a company and stake-
holders, especially targeting the Sami and other national minorities.65 A work plan 
(arbetsplan) must be approved before any exploration is carried out, in accordance 
with the exploration permit.66 An affected reindeer-herding community, among other 
stakeholders, must be informed of this work plan and the community may respond in 
writing. In the event that a company and reindeer-herding community cannot reach 
agreement, the Chief Mining Inspector may authorise the work plan if it meets stat-
utory requirements regarding content. A reindeer-herding community may request 
that the work plan be translated into the Sami language.
In addition, environmental permits are required under the Environmental Code 
in order to run a mine and its related activities.67 Here the Sami and other affected 
stakeholders are consulted in the context of the EIA. This late in the process, a Sami 
community may only stress the need for mitigation, since the exploitation permit 
under the Minerals Act has already been granted.
To sum up, Swedish mineral legislation lacks a consultation requirement that 
would give the Sami the possibility of exercising a real influence on the process and 
outcome. As long as consultation merely means corporate consultation, samråd, the 
Sami have little influence over resource exploitation, which may potentially have a 
severe impact on a community’s reindeer herding activities. Although proper consul-
tations with the state would not allow vetoing of mineral exploitation, nevertheless on 
a strategic level, future legislation may be informed by a better balance between the 
interests of mineral development and those of conserving an Indigenous livelihood 
that is the cornerstone of Sami culture.
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3.4 Short Comments
Although the consultation duty of the three Nordic States towards the Sami is ra-
tionalised on the basis of international law obligations (Human Rights treaties), the 
countries exhibit highly diverse interpretations of this duty.
The two Consultation Agreements in Norway have a broader scope than the pro-
vision in the Finnish Sami Parliament Act, 1995. Though the consultation provision 
in Finland was novel at the time of its incorporation, it has taken a long time to 
establish firm grounds for consultation, and still seems to lack the effectiveness that 
the consultation arrangement enjoys in Norway. One reason may, in fact, be the tight 
economic situation of the Finnish Sami Parliament, which has the fewest allocated 
resources between the three.68 In fact, the Norwegian Sami Parliament is the most 
powerful of the three because it has continuously increased its autonomy and influ-
ence.69 Another factor may be Norway’s progress in addressing State-Sami relations 
since the end of the 1980s and onwards, acknowledging past wrongs and showing a 
willingness to build a new partnership with the Sami. Despite internal criticism from 
the Sami,70 and room for improvement, consultation, in comparison, functions rather 
well in Norway and has on several accounts been successful, not least in relation to 
law-making processes.
As indicated, the State’s consultation duty in Norway encompasses the whole 
country in general matters and the vast reindeer herding area in matters pertaining 
to land management (traditional Sami areas), whereas, so far, the Finnish section 9 
is confined to the Sami homeland area. Notice that the majority of the Sami in all 
three countries live in urban areas outside the traditional Sami region. The Finnish 
provision is also limited with respect to whom the Finnish Sami Parliament may 
consult with, that is, the Government and state authorities, while in Norway, regional 
governments and state enterprises may in certain instances also have consultation 
obligations, however, the question of how to include municipalities has still not been 
solved. Other Sami groups in Norway also have the right to be consulted when nec-
essary, which is especially relevant in resource development projects such as mineral 
extractions. Otherwise, matters subject to consultation are more or less the same in 
both countries.
Presently Sweden lacks any specific formal or non-formal rules on consultation with 
the Sami, but a legal proposal has recently been forwarded (see Ch. 3.3). Consulta-
tions, or rather samråd, are conducted in the EIA process as corporate consultations. 
These consultations are restricted to environmental matters, which were deemed to 
be insufficient in the recent Canadian Clyde River case (see below Ch. 4). On the 
whole, Sweden has problems in addressing the Sami as a distinct (Indigenous) peo-
ple, despite a prominent international reputation otherwise in upholding and pro-
moting human rights.
All three Nordic countries apply a dualistic approach towards international law. 
Although Sweden and Finland have ratified all major Human Rights Conventions, 
they have explicitly only incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights.71 
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In Norway international law, comparatively, seems to play a more prominent role, 
evident for instance in Government Commissions (preparatory works) where inter-
national obligations are closely and lengthily evaluated, at least in matters pertaining 
to environmental protection and Sami rights issues. Norway directly incorporated 
five major Human Rights Conventions into their domestic laws in 199972 (but not the 
ILO Convention No. 169). Where there is an inconsistency with domestic law, pro-
visions in the Convention trump. Norway is already a party to ILO Convention No. 
169 and has a legal obligation to conform to it. Consequently, these Human Rights 
treaties have a stronger position in the Norwegian legal culture, which is supportive 
of Sami rights discourse.
Norway, Finland and Sweden have traditionally relied on international laws and 
obligations regarding their duty to consult the Sami in matters directly affecting 
them. This approach contrasts with Canada, where the duty to consult is incorpo-
rated into national legislation. It has taken longer for the Nordic countries to discuss 
and properly acknowledge consultations vis-à-vis the Sami compared to the Cana-
dian approach to this duty. One explanation for this may be that international law is 
seen as “foreign” until properly incorporated into national legal systems, and there-
fore barristers and courts in the Nordic countries have refrained from acknowledging 
and applying international consultation standards with respect to the Sami.
4. The Duty to Consult in Canadian Law
Interestingly, in the Canadian legal context the state’s duty to consult is not informed 
by international law obligations, but is seen first and foremost as a basic constitu-
tional right. It is associated with impacts on Aboriginal claims and rights, including 
prima facie rights.73 The state’s obligation to consult has evolved through case law 
under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, and thereby offers special protec-
tion for Aboriginal and treaty rights. Section 35(1) declares that “[t]he existing ab-
original and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized 
and affirmed”. Early case law confirms that this short provision provides a constitu-
tional base upon which subsequent negotiations can take place.74 Notice that specific 
rules on consultation are part of modern land claims agreements, which include the 
Canadian Arctic, an issue that is not addressed in this paper.75
The early jurisprudence on the state’s consultation duty has evolved under the 
principle of the honour of the Crown,76 meaning the duty of dealing honourably with 
matters arising from an assertion of sovereignty. The principle is of great relevance, 
especially in Crown dealings related to land and natural resources and potential im-
pacts on Aboriginal communities’ rights.77 The Haida Nation case was the first Su-
preme Court case to address consultation and concerned logging on islands to which 
a tribe has claimed title for over a hundred years. The Court held that the Province 
had failed to meet its consultation duty and that this duty also required accommo-
dating the interests of the tribe.78
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Several succeeding cases, from 2010 and onwards, have developed the content and 
circumstances of the duty to consult. For instance, the recent Clyde River case (July 
2017) concerned whether a federal independent agency, the National Energy Board 
(NEB), had fulfilled the Crown’s consultation obligation.79 The NEB, which in this 
case approved offshore seismic testing for oil and gas in Nunavut that could negatively 
affect the treaty rights of the Inuit of Clyde River, was acting on behalf of the Crown 
when it as the final decision maker authorized the project application. The company 
had consulted with the Inuit group and the group had (limited) opportunity to partic-
ipate in the NEB’s process. But, as the discussion concerning affected aboriginal rights 
was subsumed within an environmental assessment, consultation and accommodation 
were held to be inadequate and fell short in several respects, not least in the failure to 
inquire into the impact on the right itself, not only the environmental effects per se. As 
a result NEB’s authorization was quashed by the Supreme Court of Canada.
Nowadays there are detailed government policies on the duty to consult at pro-
vincial and federal levels, and some Aboriginal communities have developed their 
own policies.80 A few provinces have included consultation requirements in natural 
resources law, such as mining legislation.
An interesting development worth mentioning here has occurred with respect to 
the ten principles adopted by the Government of Canada summer 2017, “Principles 
respecting the Government of Canada's relationship with Indigenous peoples”, and 
that may affect the application of the Crown’s consultation duty in the near future.81 
The Principles are an attempt at renewing the Crown-Aboriginal relationship, and 
among other things it is stated that UNDRIP requires transformative change with re-
spect to this relationship. Principle six mentions that this renewed relationship should 
go beyond the legal duty to consult, and refers explicitly to the concept of FPIC, stat-
ing that this standard to secure consent will be strongest concerning Aboriginal title 
lands. Hence, UNDRIP and the concept of FPIC may very well become influential 
in the near future, at least in policy regarding the consultation and accommodation 
duties of the Canadian State.
Briefly, the duty to consult primarily belongs to governments, but can be delegated 
to third parties, normally in relation to an EIA.82 Nevertheless, ultimate responsi-
bility for the duty rests on the Crown alone, although it is becoming more com-
mon for industry stakeholders and Aboriginal communities to engage in corporate 
consultation and in fact make it a non-optional practice.83 Beneficiaries of the duty 
are rights-bearing Aboriginal communities under section 35 of the Constitution. 
Government measures affecting Aboriginal communities’ land and resource rights 
is the chief focus of consultation. Whether the duty to consult includes legislative 
actions has not yet been decided by case law, but was briefly raised in one case from 
201084, and might become common practise because of the Principles mentioned 
above.85 The content of the consultation and accommodation varies with the validity 
of the claim and the seriousness of the effect on the asserted right (a spectrum ap-
proach).86 Within this spectrum, the duty ranges from minimal notice to substantial 
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consultation and accommodation, but does not presently include a power of veto for 
the Aboriginal community.87 The duty to consult has gained prominence in the field 
of Aboriginal law in Canada, but it is a complex doctrine and continues to evolve 
both within and outside the law.
5. Short Conclusions
A common denominator among the Nordic countries is an understanding that the 
duty to consult the Sami stems from obligations under international law and various 
treaties, which in turn leads to an elevated role for the Sami Parliaments as the rep-
resentative bodies for all Sami. As we have seen above, in Canadian law, the State’s 
duty to consult Aboriginal right-bearing communities stems from a constitutional 
background and is built around the principle of the honour of the Crown. Never-
theless, as Dwight Newman has said, the duty to consult in Canada does not exist in 
isolation, but is situated within the context of a larger set of international law norms 
which interact with domestic Canadian law concerning consultation with Aboriginal 
peoples.88 Whether the concept of FCIP in the UNDRIP will evolve in Canadian case 
law remains, however, to be seen.
As shown in this article, the rationale for the duty to consult Indigenous peoples 
in a Nordic and Canadian setting is clearly different. In Canada, the duty to consult 
is part of internal law and developed by courts, in particular the Supreme Court of 
Canada, as a response to giving effect and meaning to section 35(1) for Aboriginal 
communities. It moulds the relations between Aboriginal communities and other 
communities in Canada. In the Nordic States the duty to consult the Sami origi-
nates from law outside the domestic legal system. In this sense international legal ob-
ligations are foreign law implemented into national law. I cannot help wondering if 
this aspect is a reason behind the longstanding reluctance of the Nordic States, and 
especially Sweden, towards formalising and properly applying specific consultation 
rights for the Sami. It seems much easier to accept laws that have evolved through 
the national court system, and supreme court rulings on cases have another kind of 
legitimacy.
With respect to the three Nordic countries, there are remarkable differences to 
their approaches given the fact that the Sami are one people across all the states. Nor-
way has the most evolved rules on consultation with the Consultation Agreements 
and Guidelines, while Sweden still lacks specific provisions on consultation with the 
Sami, although this may change in the near future if the new act is passed. In Finland 
the duty to consult is restricted to the Sami homeland area.
The Sami Parliament is seen as the key partner in consultation in all three states, 
but in Norway, other Sami groups and organisations may also have the right to be 
consulted, depending on the matter at hand. If it concerns natural resource develop-
ment, affected reindeer herders and other Sami right-holders should be offered con-
sultation. It has been highlighted that opinions may differ among local Sami groups 
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and the Sami Parliament concerning a plan or resources development, which fur-
thers the need to consult with other Sami groups than the Sami Parliament in order 
to meet the international duty to consult.
One downside of the duty to consult Indigenous peoples arising from obligations 
under international law is that in order to become effective it needs to be fully 
incorporated into national law so that the right can be properly enforced through 
the domestic court system. This is not the case in Norway at present because the 
duty is based on political agreements and not legislation. However, it is unlikely 
that the Nordic States would have developed their own set of national rules on 
the duty to consult in the manner of Canada without the international laws. One 
reason is the fact that the Nordic States, in adhering to the civil law system, have 
weaker constitutions and court systems than Canada; another is that the Nordic 
States have a long tradition of hearing interests groups and allowing comments on 
legislative proposals (remiss/høring). International law may also influence or inspire 
the development of the state’s consultation duty in Canada, for instance regarding 
legislative measures.
Undoubtedly, the duty to consult (and seek consent) is evolving internationally 
as well as in the Nordic and Canadian contexts. At a minimum, prior to exploration 
or exploitation of resources attached to traditional territories – or prior to other de-
cisions that may negatively impact on their communities – states need to engage in 
good faith consultations with the Indigenous people and/or potentially affected In-
digenous groups. Such consultation not only encompasses environmental impacts, 
but also property rights and other rights. Lack of adequate consultation may lead to 
escalating conflicts resulting in expressions of anger and mistrust. We should remind 
ourselves that one purpose of consultation “is to respect Indigenous communities 
rather than to force changes upon them”.89
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